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Abstract:  This article explores the extent (if any) to which a court should inquire 
into the merits of a case when deciding on motions to certify a class.  The Article 
examines three stylized rules: strong-form rules which preclude inquiry into the merits 
and require the court to take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true for 
purposes of the class certification motion; weak-form rules which permit the court to 
inquire into merits issues that are convenient or useful in connection with the analysis of 
Rule 23’s certification requirements; and super-weak rules which permit or require the 
court to inquire into the class’s ultimate chances of success on the merits.  The Article 
evaluates these rules along the following dimensions of public policy: fidelity to law; 
accuracy in adjudication; fairness with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments; 
fairness with respect to settlements; and judicial efficiency.  The Article concludes that 
weak-form rules dominate over the others along most policy dimensions.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,2  the Supreme Court declared that federal courts 
may not “conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine 
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”3  This proscription – sometimes known 
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2as the “Eisen” rule – has become a pillar of class action practice, both under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and under state-court class action procedures.4  The rule can 
have a crucial influence on whether a case is certified as a class action – and, given the 
importance of certification, on the success or failure of the litigation.5
This Article analyzes the proper scope of a court’s inquiry into the merits when 
ruling on motions to certify a class.  Part I of the Article distinguishes three approaches to 
this question: strong-form rules that prohibit inquiries into the merits and require the 
court to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; weak-form rules that 
permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification; and super-weak 
rules which permit or require the court to investigate the class’s chances of success in the 
litigation.  Parts II-VI compare these rules with respect to the values of fidelity to law, 
accuracy in adjudication, fairness with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments, 
fairness in settlements, and judicial economy.  Part VII argues that weak- form rules are 
superior to the alternative approaches.
I.  The Faces of Eisen
The rule that the trial court should not inquire into the merits at the time it decides 
the motion to certify a class is simple to state but difficult to apply.  The key terms –
“merits” and “inquiry” – have no clear meaning in the law.  The facts of Eisen provide 
4 For state court endorsements of the Eisen principle, see, e.g., Arkansas State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Magnolia Sch. Dist. No. 14, 298 Ark. 603, 769 S.W.2d 419 (1989); Ex parte Holland, 692 So. 2d 811, 821-22 
(Ala. 1997).
5 On the importance of certification, see, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“the class certification turns a $200,000 dispute . . . into a $200 million dispute. Such a claim . . . 
may induce a substantial settlement even if the customers' position is weak”); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) (certification is often the “defining moment” 
in class actions); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (certification can create 
“insurmountable” settlement pressure on defendants); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-
1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing settlement pressure from certification); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. 
3little help.  Because the case concerned notice costs and not certification, the rule is pure 
dictum.6  Later cases have only compounded the problems.7
This Part investigates possible approaches to the question of the preliminary 
merits review on certification.  It classifies Eisen rules into three stylized variants.  The 
purpose is to identify types of rule that can then be compared and contrasted along 
various dimensions of public policy.
The following hypothetical case illustrates contexts in which Eisen rules may
apply.  Plaintiff’s counsel brings a putative opt-out class action against the manufacturer 
of a product alleging violations of a consumer protection statute.  Certification is 
governed by a class action rule identical to Federal Rule 23.  The consumer protection 
statute states that the measure of damages is the difference between what the plaintiff 
paid for the product and what the product would be worth if the defendant’s 
representations were true.  The statute is ambiguous on whether individual reliance can 
be presumed where the statements complained of are contained in defendant’s uniform 
printed materials.  
Defendant resists certification on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) 
the issues common to the class do not predominate over the individual issues  because the 
measure of damages requires a determination of how much each class member paid for 
Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987) ($180,000,000 settlement described  as “nuisance value” given 
defendants’ liability exposure).
6 See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include 
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 376 (1996).
7 Trial court decisions interpreting Eisen exhibit little coherence.  Some courts even recite 
inconsistent formulations of the rule as boilerplate in a single decision.  See, e.g., In re: Buspirone Patent 
Litigation; In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15867 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (listing 
formulations of the rule).  Federal courts of appeals have begun to address the subject developed under 
4the product; (3) the representative plaintiff’s claims are not typical of the class because 
the products in question were manufactured at different plants using different 
technologies; (4) the common questions do not predominate because individual reliance 
is an element of the action for damages; (5) predominance is lacking because many class 
members made claims under the express warranty; and (6) certification should be denied 
because the class’s claims are frivolous. 
What limitations (if any) does Eisen impose on the scope of the court’s inquiry 
and analysis?  The questions on which issue is joined involve distinctly different judicial 
inquiries. 
 The issue of numerosity is substantially unrelated to the merits.  The relevant 
inquiries are factors such as the number of members of the class, their places of 
residence,8 and the ease of locating them and joining them in an individual action.9 One 
matter that may bear on numerosity – for example, the average size of class claims10 –
does potentially implicate the merits (the stronger the claims, the larger the expected 
recovery per class member).  But by and large the inquiry is not merits-based.  
The second issue – whether the determination of individual damages defeats 
predominance – requires that the court at least look to the merits.  The predominance 
analysis requires a weighing of the common and individual issues and a comparison 
between them.  But such an inquiry, while it does look to the merits, need not involve 
even a preliminary assessment of any substantive issue.  Because the statute is clear on 
F.R.C.P. 23(f), effective in 1998, which permits discretionary appeals from orders granting or refusing class 
certification.  As yet, however, the appellate jurisprudence remains sparse.
8 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 175 (D.Del. 1982).
9 See, e.g., Patrykus v. Gomilla, 121 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
10 See, e.g., Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (numerosity is more easily 
satisfied when the “individual claims are for small amounts of damages”).
5the measure of damages, the court merely needs to analyze whether the common 
questions will predominate (e.g., take up more of the court’s and the litigants’ time and 
efforts).
The third issue is whether typicality is defeated because the allegedly defective 
products were manufactured at different plants.  The court cannot properly evaluate this 
argument without investigating whether the claims of class members who purchased 
products made in one factory are different than the claims of class members who 
purchased products made in the other factory.  At least some inquiry into the merits 
appears to be required to reach an informed judgment about this question.
The fourth issue turns on an interpretation of the consumer protection statute.  It is 
evident that the court cannot intelligently evaluate whether individual questions of 
reliance defeat predominance without knowing whether class members will have to prove 
reliance.  But this is also a key matter in dispute on the merits.  If the court concludes 
preliminarily that the statute requires individual reliance, this may defeat certification, but 
it will also be a conclusion which, if it holds up at trial, reduces the strength of the 
plaintiff’s claims.  Conversely, if the court concludes preliminarily that individual 
reliance is not an element of the statute, the court may conclude that the common issues 
predominate.  But if this conclusion holds up at trial, it will also strengthen the class’s 
case on the merits because class members will not have to establish individual reliance in 
order to obtain relief.  As to this issue, therefore, the central focus of the certification 
inquiry directly overlaps a crucial merits determination.
The fifth issue, going to waiver of claims, may involve both factual and legal 
inquiries.  Factually, the plaintiff’s counsel may contest the defendant’s argument that 
6numerous class members have made claims under the warranty; legally, counsel may 
argue that a claim under the warranty does not foreclose a subsequent lawsuit under the 
consumer protection statute.  Each of these issues is tied up in the merits.  But the scope 
of preliminary inquiry differs.  As to the legal issues, the court need only consider the 
briefs and arguments of the parties (supplemented if necessary by the court’s own 
research).  As to the factual question, the court could consider documentary evidence or 
witness testimony and may allow adversarial testing (for example, depositions or cross-
examination).
The final issue is distinctive in that it does not bear on any specific issue of class 
certification.  In arguing that the class claims are frivolous, the defendant is inviting the 
court to use class certification as a preliminary screen to filter out bad cases.  The scope 
of preliminary inquiry needed to address this issue will necessarily be broader than the 
inquiries needed for other issues because here the matter in question is the ultimate issue 
for resolution in the lawsuit.
With this example in mind, we can attempt to make sense of possible rules.  Some 
issues are not in dispute.  Courts agree that the Eisen rule applies only to the merits.  
Thus, in the example above, Eisen would not preclude investigation into numerosity 
because this inquiry has no substantial relationship to the merits.11  It is also clear that the 
Eisen rule does not preclude a careful analysis of the pleadings so long as the court makes 
no judgments about the substantive claims.  Finally, it is clear that the ultimate burden of 
proof on certification rests on the party seeking class treatment – nearly always the 
11 For examples of courts looking beyond the pleadings in assessing whether the numerosity 
requirement is met, see, e.g., Sheinhartz v. Saturn Transportation System, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6198 
(D.Minn. 2002); Potter v. Citicorp and Citibank, NA, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11596 (D.V.I. 2002); Verdow v. 
Sutkowy, 209 F.R.D. 309 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
7plaintiff.12  Beyond these areas of agreement, however, the case law offers a menu of 
interpretations.   
A.  Strong-Form Rules
The most common formulation holds that a court ruling on a motion to certify the 
class may not go beyond the face of the pleadings with respect to any issues relating to 
the merits, but must instead accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.13
This strong-form rule involves a number of subsidiary questions as to which courts may 
express different opinions:
(a) Can there be inquiry beyond the pleadings if the matter in dispute goes to the 
merits of the named plaintiff’s case, but not to the merits of the class case as a whole?  This 
situation often arises when the defendant challenges the representative plaintiff’s adequacy 
or typicality.14   In Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp.,15 the defendant argued that the named 
plaintiffs were inadequate because they provided testimony that was demonstrably false.16
The court rejected the argument, citing the principle that “any inquiry concerning . . . 
credibility is an impermissible examination of the merits.”17  Here, the court applied a 
strong-form rule to bar inquiry into the named plaintiff’s case.  In other cases, however, 
12 See note x, infra.
13 See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999); In re: Buspirone 
Patent Litigation; In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15867 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);  In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002).
14 See, e.g., Lagner v. Brown, 1996 WL 709757 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (court refused to consider a challenge 
to the named plaintiff’s typicality on strong-form grounds); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Department, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9981 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
15 211 F.R.D. 478 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
16 Id. at 490.
17 Id.
8courts do not apply a strong-form rule strictly when the merits issues relate only to the 
individual plaintiff.18
(b) What should the court do with respect to defenses?  In the example above, this 
issue would be raised by the defendant’s argument that class members who returned the 
express warranty waived their rights to obtain relief under other legal theories, thereby 
creating individual defenses that defeat predominance.  Some courts refuse certification if 
the defendant’s pleadings raise affirmative defenses which, if true, would negate an 
element required for certification.19  Other courts apply a strong-form rule in a pro-
plaintiff way even for defenses, holding that to take cognizance of the defenses would 
delve impermissibly into the merits.20  Still others deal with this problem through 
interpretations of Rule 23: they hold that it is not necessary to look beyond the pleadings 
because the affirmative defenses, even if proved, would not defeat certification.21
(c) The scope of a strong-form rule also depends on the detail that courts will 
require in pleadings.  Merely alleging that Rule 23 is satisfied is not sufficient.22   Neither 
are pleadings that refer to the elements of Rule 23 in purely conclusory fashion.23  The 
pleadings must set forth “an adequate statement of the basic facts.”24  But they need not 
18 See, e.g., Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (recognizing that inquiries 
into the merits are prohibited under Eisen, but still inquiring into defendant’s claim that the representative 
plaintiffs were not adequate because they lacked credibility).
19 See Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir. 1998).   For an 
analysis calling for an across-the-board application of Eisen to affirmative defenses, see Priya Laroia, 
Individualized Affirmative Defenses Bar Class Certification--Per Se, 2003 University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 805, 810 (2003).
20 See In re Data Access Sys. Securities Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 139-40 (D.N.J. 1984) ("[E]ven if 
[defendants] can prove non-reliance as an affirmative defense, this goes to the merits of the case and cannot be 
considered by the court on a certification motion.")
21 See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2000).  
22 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d. 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).
23 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d. 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).
24 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d. 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).
9contain the sort of detail that is required, for example, for allegations of common law 
fraud.25
(d) Courts adopting a strong-form rule sometimes justify inquiries beyond the 
pleadings on the ground that they do not involve the “merits.”  In Lehocky v. Tidel 
Technologies, Inc.,26 the court faced the question whether a fraud-on-the-market 
presumption obviated the need to prove reliance for each class member – an issue going 
to certification.  The court took evidence on this question on the ground that the fraud-on-
the-market analysis was not an inquiry into the “merits.”27 By manipulating the concept 
of the “merits” the court was able to remain formally in compliance with a strong-form 
rule while still considering evidence relevant to certification.
(e) Courts that endorse a strong-form rule typically permit the trial judge to go 
beyond the pleadings to “understand” the case.28  The court’s job is to “envison” the form 
a trial will take.”29  This approach, drawing on the Manual on Complex Litigation,30
attempts to reconcile the notion that Eisen precludes going beyond the pleadings with the 
practical necessity of doing so if judicial rulings on matters such as predominance are to 
be meaningful.31  Even if the court engages in a “thorough” examination of the relevant 
25 See F.R.C.P. 9 (fraud must be pleaded with particularity).
26
___ F.Supp.2d ___ (S.D. Tex. 2004).
27
___ F.Supp.2d ___ , __ n. 16 (S.D. Tex. 2004). The merits would be implicated, said the court, only 
if the defendant sought to rebut the presumption with respect to a given class member.
28 This formulation is from Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).  See 
also Sheinhartz v. Saturn Transportation System, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6198 (D.Minn. 2002); Dhamer 
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 183 F.R.D. 520, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
29 Clay v. American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 489 (S.D. Ill. 1999).
30 See Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.11, at 214 (3d ed. 1995).
31 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules seemed to adopt this position in its report on the 2003 
amendments to Rule 23, opining that “[a]lthough an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not 
properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes 
information required to identify the nature of the issues that actually be presented at trial. In this sense it is 
appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the ‘merits,’ limited to those aspects relevant to making the 
certification decision on an informed basis.”  Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, May 20, 2002, 98.  
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evidence,32 however, its task is only to predict how the trial will proceed, not to resolve 
contested issues of fact or law.
(f) A rule against probing behind the pleadings will not prevent preliminary 
inquiries if the pleadings are patently frivolous.33  In Martin v. American Medical 
Systems, Inc.,34 the representative plaintiff alleged that all recipients of the defendant’s 
penile implant devices had experienced problems with the product.  The court looked 
behind the pleadings and concluded that many recipients had not experienced problems.  
Because such class members were not harmed, the plaintiff was neither typical of the 
class nor capable of providing adequate representation.  It appears clear that the judge 
found the allegation that all devices had malfunctioned to be patently incredible and 
rejected it on this ground.
Similarly, courts employing a strong-form rule may look beyond the pleadings 
when an issue of law bearing on certification is conclusively established by controlling 
precedent.  McBride v. Reliastar Mortg. Corp.35 was a putative class action under the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).  The plaintiff alleged that the common 
issues predominated because the defendant’s practice of paying mortgage brokers for 
order flow violated the statutory rights of all class members.  Refusing to certify the 
class, the court observed that merely paying for order flow was not enough to state a 
cause of action under RESPA; individualized proof was required.  The court, in other 
words, refused to accept the plaintiff’s characterization of the case and instead conducted 
its own analysis of governing law.
32 See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 140 (3d Cir. 1998).
33 See Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (“A court need not accept a 
facially frivolous claim that stock was traded on an efficient market.”)
34 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22169 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
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(g) The application of a strong-form rule may vary depending on whether the 
issue is one of fact or law.  As to factual inquiries, the rule is typically applied in a 
straightforward way.  In the example above, defendant alleges that the plaintiff would not 
be an adequate or typical representative of class members who purchased goods 
manufactured at other plants.  The plaintiff alleges that all of the defendant’s products 
wherever manufactured were subject to the defect.  For purposes of the motion for class 
certification, a court employing a strong- form rule would accept as true the allegation that 
all products were subject to the defect regardless of place of manufacture.  
Application of a strong-form rule to questions of law is more problematic. In 
Rosen v. Fidelity Fixed Income Trust,36 the defendant issued three registration statements.  
The representative plaintiff alleged that she purchased her shares in reliance on one of the 
statements.  This raised a certification issue: was the representative plaintiff typical of the 
class when some class members had purchased shares as to which a different registration 
statement was in effect?  The defendant asserted that the representative plaintiff could not 
claim injury stemming from misstatements in another registration statement.  Plaintiff’s 
counsel responded that a party could recover for misstatements in a different registration 
statement when the underlying securities were identical. The court avoided this issue by 
reference to Eisen.  Whether a party who has been misled by one registration statement 
has standing to recover for other registration statements was a merits issue foreclosed to 
the court in ruling on class certification.  Thus, typicality was not defeated: “[t]o the 
extent that Plaintiff may pursue her [securities law] claims against each of the three 
35 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21654 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
36 169 F.R.D. 295 (E.D.Pa. 1995).
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registration statements, her claims are typical of class.”37 Other courts do not apply a 
strong-form rule to purely legal questions.  In Gibbs Products Corp. v. Cigna Corp.,38 a 
question at certification was whether the class was entitled to a presumption of reliance in 
a RICO mail fraud claim.  If the court had applied the facial validity standard to this issue 
it would have accepted the plaintiff’s interpretation of RICO.  Instead, the court inquired 
into the merits and held that a presumption of reliance was not allowed.39
2.  Weak-Form Rules
Weak-form rules provide permit inquiries into the merits if they bear an 
appropriate relationship to an the issue of certification.40  In the hypothetical case 
described above, for example, it might be desirable for the trial court to inquire into the 
defendant’s claim that different technologies of production at different plants defeated 
certification.  But it might not be necessary for the court to inquire into the related issue 
of whether the technologies were equally prone to producing the alleged defect.
Weak-form rules are finding increasing acceptance.  Two court of appeals 
decisions from 2001 are particularly noteworthy.  In Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,41
Judge Easterbrook denounced strong-form rules as having “nothing to recommend 
[them].”42  The trial court must instead make “whatever factual and legal inquires are 
necessary.”43  If such an inquiry involved the merits, so be it.  In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
37 Id at 299.
38 196 F.R.D. (M.D. Fla. 2000).
39 Id. at 438-39.
40 See, e.g., In re Unioil Securities Litigation, 107 F.R.D. 615, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (court is at liberty 
“to consider evidence which goes to the requirements of Rule 23 even though the evidence may also relate to 
the underlying merits of the case.”)
41 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
42 Id.at 675.
43 Id. at 676.
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Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,44 the plaintiffs produced expert testimony on predominance 
purporting to demonstrate that economic loss for each class member could be determined 
with a simple formula.  Because this testimony claimed to provide a potentially viable 
measure of class-wide damages, it had an obvious bearing on the merits.  Observing that “a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes necessary to determine whether the 
alleged claims can be properly resolved as a class action,”45 Judge Scirica evaluated and 
rejected the testimony as both unpersuasive and inadequate to establish compliance with 
Rule 23(b)(3).
Weak-form rules implicate two subsidiary questions: (a) when is an inquiry into 
the merits excessive? and (b) how preliminary must the preliminary inquiry be?
(a) Some courts employing a weak-form rule declare that the court should not 
make unnecessary inquiries into the merits.46 If strictly applied, a necessity standard 
would allow inquiries into the merits only if a court could not otherwise make a reasoned 
decision on a certification question.  Yet strict necessity may not always be required.  
Some courts indicate that Eisen merely requires that the trial court exercise “caution” in 
evaluating the merits.47  The suggestion may be that while courts should not willfully reach 
out to decide merits issues, neither should they avoid inquiries that would be convenient 
44 259 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir. 2001).
45 259 F.3d at 168.
46 See, e.g., Fisher v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 217 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“the Court will 
inquire no further into the merits than is necessary to determine the likely contours of this action should it 
proceed on a representative basis”); In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677, 684
(N.D. Ga. 2001); Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619 (N.D. Ga. 2003). In 
some cases a necessity standard is implied.   See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 
(5th Cir. 1996) (“going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand the claims, defenses, 
relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification 
issues”) (emphasis supplied); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (“[i]t is 
inescapable that in some cases there will be overlap between the demands of [Rule 23] and the question of 
whether plaintiff can succeed on the merits”) (emphasis supplied).
47 Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., 84 Fed. Appx. 257 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166-68 (3d Cir. 2001).
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and useful to the resolution of the certification motion even if the court might be able to 
make a reasoned decision without this information. 
(b) There will be delicate questions as to how preliminary the preliminary inquiry 
must be.  Courts tend to provide upper and lower bounds: the hearing on class 
certification should not amount to a “mini-trial”48 but the court must at least survey the 
factual scene on a “kind of sketchy relief map.”49 These admonitions leave room for 
investigation of merits issues so long as the investigation does not become protracted or 
complex.  In exercising this discretion, the court will need to determine issues such as 
how extensive the hearing will be, what evidence will be considered, and what safeguards 
on reliability of evidence will be imposed.  
Courts employing a weak-form rule may consider not only the intensity of inquiry 
but also the directness of connection between the matters inquired into at certification and 
the merits at trial.  In some cases, the results of the court’s inquiry at certification, while 
related to the merits, will only be indirectly related to the trial outcome.  For example, the 
court may ask whether a securities market was sufficiently efficient to qualify for a fraud-
on-the-market presumption.  The results of this ruling, if they hold up through trial, will 
impact the expected outcome.50  But a ruling that the market is efficient for purposes of 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not establish liability or damages.  Compare 
this with cases where the evidence on certification has a direct bearing on the merits.  In 
Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand,51 for example, the defendant argued that representative 
48 See, e.g., In re: Buspirone Patent Litigation; In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15867 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
49 Professional Adjusting Systems of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 35, 
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
50 If the market is found to be efficient, plaintiffs will enjoy a presumption of reliance and may find 
it easier to establish causation and damages
51 216 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
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plaintiffs were inadequate because they had purchased securities after the defendant’s 
truthful disclosures had cured the market.  The court declined to address the question 
because the certification issue could be resolved with other facts not so deeply 
intertwined with the merits.52
3.  Super-Weak Rules
Super-weak rules allow or encourage the court at certification to evaluate the 
plaintiff’s probability of success per se (we will refer to this value as p).53 The sixth issue 
in the hypothetical case discussed above illustrates this question: the defendant argues
that certification should be denied because the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous.  Rhone-
Poulenc,54 the leading case, used such an approach.55  Judge Posner refused to certify a 
nationwide class of hemophiliacs who claimed that they had contracted AIDS through 
tainted transfusions, in part because he viewed p as exceptionally low.  Super-weak rules 
open all substantive matters for review at certification subject only to the court’s 
discretion to limit the preliminary inquiry in the interests of efficiency and expedition. 
II.  Fidelity to Law
52 Specifically, the court found that the representative plaintiffs had purchased before the alleged cure.
53 Several commentators have recently recommended adoption of super-weak rules.  Bartlett H. 
McGuire advocates a “substantial possibility of success” standard for review of the substantive merits at 
certification. Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include 
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1996).  Robert Bone and David S. Evans propose a super-weak 
form rule under which the district court would be required to investigate the merits at certification and 
permitted to certify a class only if he or she concluded that the underlying claims met a “likelihood of 
success” standard. Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke 
Law Journal 1251 (2002).  A super-weak form rule is recommended for tort class actions in Stephen Berry, 
Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage 
Action, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 312-15 (1980).  Similarly, George Priest argues that for mass tort actions, if 
the trial court determines that the substantive case is “without merit,” class certification should be denied.  
George L. Priest, Procedural versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 Journal of Legal 
Studies 521, 571 (1997).
54 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
55 See also Alexander v. Q.T.S. Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16169 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (after citing Eisen 
for the proposition that the court could not delve into the merits on certification, the court examined the merits 
and observed that the plaintiffs had presented “sufficient evidence” to establish that the claims were not 
insubstantial).
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A starting place for comparison is the extent to which these variants are 
supportable under existing law.  
Strong-form rules have been recited and applied by numerous state and federal 
courts in the years since Eisen.  Yet while support for strong-form rules may be wide, it is 
not deep.  Judges typically invoke strong-form rules as a shortcut on the path to 
certification.  They rarely consider whether such rules are correct interpretations of Eisen
or Rule 23.  In fact, strong-form rules cannot be justified on principles of fidelity to law.  
They find no grounding in the text of Rule 23 and are inconsistent with its purposes.  It 
would be bizarre to conclude that the framers of Rule 23 would have set forth a careful 
set of prerequisites for class certification only to deny trial courts the ability to apply 
those prerequisites in a factually-based and reasoned manner.
Nor can strong-form rules be justified as mandated by Eisen itself.  Eisen does not 
prohibit inquiries into the merits for purposes of determining whether a class is properly 
certifiable. The opinion rejected only preliminary inquiries into the merits that were 
unrelated to the criteria of Rule 23 – i.e., that had no proper relevance to certification.  
Even taking Eisen’s language at face value, it does not mandate a strong-form rule.  
Strong-form rules, moreover, cannot be reconciled with later Supreme Court 
cases.  General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon56 admonished trial courts to 
conduct a “rigorous inquiry” at certification57 -- an instruction flatly inconsistent with the 
hands-off approach to the merits demanded under a strong-form rule.  Basic Inc. v. 
56 General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
57 On the relationship between Falcon and Eisen, see, e.g., Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class 
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251, 1267-68 (2002); Priya Laroia, 
Individualized Affirmative Defenses Bar Class Certification--Per Se, 2003 University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 805, 810 (2003) (recognizing that a “a tension exists between Eisen  and Falcon); Love v. Turlington, 
733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Levinson58 substituted a substantive presumption of reliance for the blinders on judicial 
vision that a strong-form rule imposes.59  The fraud-on-the-market presumption in Basic 
cannot be intelligently administered without at least a preliminary look at the merits-related 
issue of whether the relevant market is efficient.  
Although strong-form rules continue to attract support in the lower federal 
courts,60 the trend is against them.61  Even courts paying lip service to a strong-form rules 
may undermine them by tone and nuance, cautioning that they should not be
“talismanically” invoked to “artificially limit” a trial court’s reasoned determination on 
certification.62  Strong-form rules, in short, have little justification under governing law 
aside from the fact that they have been uncritically accepted for so long.
Super-weak rules have even less foundation.  They find no authorization in the 
specific provisions of Rule 23.  Perhaps a super-weak rule could be justified as based on 
an additional, non-statutory prerequisite for certification.63  But unlike other non-statutory 
certification requirements,64 a prerequisite that the class meet some threshold probability of 
success on the merits cannot plausibly be justified as necessary for the effective 
administration of the requirements that are explicitly found in the rule.  Super-weak rules 
58 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
59 See, e.g., In re Seagate Technology II Securities Litigation, 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(concluding that Basic cannot be reconciled with Eisen).  
60 See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
61 See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001); Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell 
for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 374 
(1996).
62 Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213 F.R.D. 
484 (S.D.Fla. 2003).
63 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Columbia Law 
Review 1343, 1439 (1995).  
64 Non-statutory requirements have been recognized in addition to the explicit requirements for 
certification under Rules 23(a) and (b) – for example, the requirements that there be a reasonably definite 
class, see, e.g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1997), or in a 
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are also inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of Eisen itself.65  The very defect 
complained of in Eisen was the fact that the district court had investigated p.66 Only one 
lower federal court – the Seventh Circuit – has endorsed a super-weak rule,67 and even this 
decision has been questioned by later authority in the circuit.68
In contrast to strong-form and super-weak rules, weak-form rules are easy to 
justify under existing law.  The court applying a weak-form rule is simply engaged in the 
normal and expected judicial task of marshalling relevant evidence and applying the law to 
the facts.  In fact, any reasonable interpretation of Rule 23 mandates a weak-form rule, 
since the framers of the rule must have intended to equip trial courts with the resources to 
make an informed and reasoned decision.
Weak-form rules are consistent with Eisen.  As noted, that opinion merely 
repudiated the practice of inquiring into p.  It did not prohibit inquiries at certification that 
overlapped merits issues when the purpose of the preliminary inquiry was to evaluate 
compliance with Rule 23.  Indeed, the Court indicated that preliminary inquiries into the 
merits are often necessary to determine “whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.”69
Weak-form rules are consistent with the “rigorous scrutiny” demanded by the Supreme 
Court’s later decision in Falcon.70  They authorize trial courts to inquire into the merits 
(b)(2) case, that the class is sufficiently cohesive as to make classwide adjudication appropriate.  See, e.g.,
Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1999).
65 See In re Copley Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 461 (D. Wyo. 1995) (interpreting Rhone-
Poulenc as inconsistent with Eisen).
66 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 179, quoting Miller v. Mackey International, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).  But see 
George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 Journal of Legal 
Studies 521, 571 (1997) (suggesting that Eisen “does not directly preclude this second, negative review: the 
determination that if the underlying substantive claim is without merit, class certification should be denied.”)
67 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
68 See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[t]he 
success of the 1966 amendments (which are still in force) depends on . . . judicial willingness to certify classes 
that have weak claims as well as strong ones.”).  
69 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 179, quoting Miller v. Mackey International, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).
70 General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982)
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whenever doing so is convenient or useful to resolve a certification question.  Weak-form 
rules are also indicated by the Court’s decision in Basic.71 A trial court cannot realistically 
inquire into the efficiency of the market without preliminarily examining a question which 
is deeply interwoven with the merits.  Consistent with these cases, the recent trend in the 
lower federal courts has been to endorse weak-form rules.72
III.  Accuracy in Adjudication
The Eisen Court objected to preliminary inquiries on the ground that that the lack 
of trial-type procedures would result in inaccurate decisions.73   Two possible errors are 
relevant: (a) error in certification; and (b) error at trial.74
A.  Error in Certification
Strong-form rules create significant dangers of certification error.75 There is no 
doubt that merits issues can be relevant to certification.76 Obviously a court is more 
71 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
72 See cases cited at note xx, supra.
73 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78; In re: Buspirone Patent Litigation; In re: Buspirone Antitrust 
Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15867 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (reaching the merits might “subject some parties to 
adverse merits rulings without the benefit of the rules and procedural safeguards that traditionally apply in 
civil trials”); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Policy Holders & Members, 323 Ark. 706, 918 
S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1996).
74 For general discussion about the value of adequacy in litigation, See Louis Kaplow, The Value of 
Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307 (1994).
75 Consistently with the analysis in this paper, Bone and Evans conclude that courts are more likely to 
commit error in certification decisions under Eisen than under a rule that permits a court to make a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits at the certification stage.  See Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class 
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251, 1313-14 (2002).  Their model depends 
on the proposition that in an Eisen regime, class action attorneys will be more likely to file frivolous lawsuits, 
which are not effectively screened due to the Eisen rule and which therefore generate a rate of erroneous 
certification grants under Eisen that is higher than the rate of erroneous certification denials under a regime 
allowing preliminary inquiry.  The Bone-Evans model depends on the premise that strong-form jurisdictions 
will attract a significant number of frivolous lawsuits.  As yet there is no empirical verification of this 
proposition.  The Bone-Evans model also ignores the costs in review-of-the-merits jurisdictions associated 
with the possibility that non-frivolous class actions will not be brought because of the possibility of erroneous 
refusals to certify.  More fundamentally, the Bone-Evans model does not account for another reason why 
errors in certification are more likely under a strong-form rule than under a rule permitting preliminary 
inquiry.  Because the merits are often relevant to certification, a court that is permitted to inquire into them at 
the certification is more likely to reach a correct result than a court that is barred from such an inquiry.
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likely to make a correct decision on certification if it is allowed to look into the relevant 
facts and circumstances than if it is limited to accepting the truth of the facts presented in 
pleadings of a biased litigant.77
The impact of super-weak rules depends in part on whether p is a criterion or 
factor for certification under Rule 23.  If p is not a certification factor, judicial inquiry 
into p may increase error at certification because the court will consider a potentially 
confounding question.  On the other hand, inquiry into p may to some extent also 
improve accuracy in the certification decision to the extent that p correlates with a 
specific Rule 23 factor.
If p is a certification factor, then a preliminary inquiry into p will improve accuracy 
of decisions, provided the court correctly assesses p.  There are reasons to believe courts 
will often assess p correctly. The trial judge will usually be experienced at assessing 
litigation outcomes.78  The judge, moreover, has discretion over how the preliminary 
inquiry should be conducted.  Where the facts or law are clear, the judge may be able to 
reach a reliable result in fairly short order.  Where the issues are murkier, the judge may 
76 See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982) (class determination 
generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s 
cause of action); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (same).
77 See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[t]he court is bound to take the 
substantive allegations of the complaint as true, thus necessarily making the class order speculative in the 
sense that the plaintiff may be altogether unable to prove his allegations.”)  Although the court may revise a 
certification order found to be erroneous, see FRCP 23(c)(1)(C) (“[a]n order [certifying a class] may be 
altered or amended before final judgment”), this is no reason to allow error at the outset.  Later correction of 
erroneous certification grants will not avoid the interim costs incurred by the parties (including notice costs) 
during the period in which the class was certified.  As a practical matter, moreover, cases are rarely 
decertified.  Reliance on later review of certification orders as an answer to the error problem can encourage 
sloppy analysis at the front end.  See Southwestern Refining Col, Inc. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000) 
(rejecting a to reject a “certify now, revise later” approach to certification); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 
2002 WL 31426407 (Tex. 2002) (holding that certification may only be based on “actual, not presumed” 
conformance with the class action rule).
78 Motions for preliminary injunctions are an example.  The court in such cases is not only permitted, 
but in fact required to look into the merits in such cases in order to weigh the parties’ respective 
probabilities of success.
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require a more intensive process before “coming to rest.”79 Judges will not always assess 
p correctly, however. P is not a narrow issue that can be addressed in a focused pre-trial 
inquiry. In consequence, the lack of trial-type procedures at certification might impair 
accuracy in the court’s assessment.80 Even if p is a factor at certification, therefore, there 
appears to be a non-trivial risk that a trial court will incorrectly assess p and accordingly 
decide the certification erroneously.
Weak-form rules are clearly superior to strong-form rules as far as certification 
error is concerned.  It could hardly be otherwise because weak-form rules permit inquiry 
into relevant issues foreclosed to the court under strong-form rules.  The comparison with 
super-weak rules is more complicated.  If p is a factor at certification, the weak-form rule 
could be inferior to the super-weak rule as regards the probability of error at certification 
because the weak-form rule would then prohibit the trial court from considering relevant 
information.  On the other hand, because the inquiry under a weak-form rule is more 
focused than under a super-weak rule, the increased certification error resulting from the 
failure to consider p would have to be weighed against the greater probability of correctly 
analyzing the factors that are considered. If p is not a factor at certification, the weak-form 
rule is strictly superior to the super-weak rule.  The weak-form rule focuses the court’s 
attention on the factors relevant to certification and does not direct the court’s attention to a 
potentially confounding inquiry.
B.  Error at Trial
79 The phrase is from General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
80 Important documents or witnesses may be unavailable, for example.  Even if such evidence is 
available, the court may exclude it in the interests of expediting the certification inquiry.  Witness 
testimony may not be properly evaluated for credibility.  The relevant assessment rule may also play a role: 
if the court is required to place a thumb on the scale when reviewing the plaintiff’s evidence, the result will 
be to increase the probability of erroneous certifications.
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Turning to error at trial, consider first the application of a strong-form rule.  
Because the court gives no consideration to the merits under a strong-form rule, the 
certification decision should have no effect on the accuracy of trial outcomes.  Whether 
or not it is certified, the litigation progresses like any other case with the facts and law 
determined in the ordinary course.
Super-weak rules have an ambiguous effect on trial accuracy.  As we have seen,
the court’s preliminary inquiry into p may or may not be accurate.  An accurate 
assessment of p may improve the accuracy of trial.  Because the court has an early 
exposure to the case, the judge will be familiar with the facts and law and will likely 
make better rulings.  The judge’s preliminary rulings may also facilitate more accurate 
settlements.  An inaccurate assessment of p creates a significant risk of error at trial, 
however.81 Many judges will avoid placing inappropriate weight on the results of the 
preliminary investigation and will be open to changing their views as trial progresses.  
But some judges may feel that changing their previously-announced views would reflect 
negatively on their abilities. Other judges might experience a cognitive bias created when 
an initial view of the case, although erroneous, becomes fixed in their minds.82  If the 
judge for whatever reason is unduly attached to her erroneous estimate of p, the effect 
may be to alter the trial outcome unless the merits are clear.  This is the scenario that 
81 See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include 
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 401 (1996) (recognizing that “preliminary assessments could be 
very troublesome--and misleading--if they were based on inadequate information and therefore unreliable” but 
arguing that the concern is not as great as commonly supposed because of safeguards that can be incorporated 
into the preliminary hearing).
82 Similarly, where the parties reach a settlement of the case, the judge will have to evaluate the 
proposal for fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness.  If the judge has been erroneously preconditioned to 
maintain a certain attitude towards the litigation, this may influence how the judge assesses the settlement, 
resulting in the possibility of error harmful to absent class members.
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troubled the Court in Eisen when it warned that tentative findings might “color” 
subsequent proceedings.83
The weak-form rule is likely to be less effective at achieving accuracy at trial than 
the strong-form rule, although the effect is ambiguous.  When the court examines a merits 
issue relevant to certification, this may introduce the possibility of bias at trial with 
respect to that issue.  However, because the inquiry under a weak- form rule is focused on 
particular issues, the court is likely to make a correct determination at certification, and 
thus the chance of subsequent bias that distorts outcomes at trial will be low.  Moreover, 
bias with respect to a particular issue may not translate into distortions in outcome 
because many other issues as to which the court does not have a bias will contribute to 
the result.  At the same time, the weak-form rule directs the court’s attention to merits 
issues at an early stage of the litigation and thus may assist the court in making better 
decisions later on.  
Weak-form rules may or may not be superior to super-weak rules as regards 
accuracy at trial.  If the court accurately assesses p, a super-weak rule will be superior to 
a weak-form rule because the latter excludes consideration of p and an accurate 
assessment of p should improve trial accuracy.  If the court erroneously assesses p, the 
weak-form rule will usually be superior to the super-weak rule because of the danger that 
the court in a super-weak regime will not correct the error at trial.84
IV. Fairness with Respect to the Preclusive Effect of Judgments 
83 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
84 The court might also make an error in its assessment of the merits under a weak-form rule.
However, we have seen that because of the inquiry is more focused in weak-form rules, the possibility of error 
is considerably lower than the possibility that a court applying a super-weak rule will make an error as to p. 
For the same reason, if  the court does make an error on the merits under a weak-form rule, this is less 
likely to skew the outcome as compared with a strong-form rule, where the issues presented on certification 
are the ultimate issues in the case.
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The Eisen Court was also concerned that preliminary inquiries into the merits 
would inflict “substantial prejudice” on defendants85 by skew the playing field in 
plaintiffs’ favor with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments.  Prior to 1966, 
potential plaintiff in “spurious” class action could wait in the wings and await 
developments in the case before deciding whether to participate.86  They could intervene 
when the outcome was or was likely to be favorable and remain outside the case when the 
outcome was or was likely to be unfavorable.87  Rule 23(c)(1) was designed in part to 
discourage such “one-way intervention” by bringing parties into the case at the earliest 
practicable time.88  Mutuality of estoppel would thus be enhanced.89  But preliminary 
inquiry might reintroduce one-way intervention in a new guise because it would allow 
absent plaintiffs to be bound by favorable judgments and to avoid unfavorable ones.  This 
85 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
86 See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“If the evidence at the trial 
made their prospective position as actual class members appear weak, or if a judgment precluded the 
possibility of a favorable determination, such putative members of the class who chose not to intervene or join 
as parties would not be bound by the judgment.”).
87 See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (a “ recurrent source of abuse 
under the former Rule lay in the potential that members of the claimed class could in some situations await 
developments in the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation 
would be favorable to their interests”); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1974)
(“[m]any commentators objected that one-way intervention had the effect of giving collateral estoppel effect 
to the judgment of liability in a case where the estoppel was not mutual.  This was thought to be unfair to the 
defendant”).  
Opposition to one-way intervention was not universal.  One of the most influential articles on class 
action practice under old Rule 23 supported one-way intervention, notwithstanding the perception that it was 
“not cricket” to allow class members to “place their bets after the race was over.” Harry Kalven Jr. and 
Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 University of Chicago Law Review 684, 
715 (1940-41) (Kalven and Rosenfield are not responsible for the mixed sports metaphor, which is due to 
combining quotes from different sentences).  Their support of one-way intervention was due, in part, to their 
belief that the Constitution would not permit otherwise unrelated parties who had not joined the action to be 
bound by the preclusive effect of a judgment.
88 See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966 amendments were 
designed, in part, specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that members of 
the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and 
judgments”); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (1966 amendment intended to 
prevent “sideline sitting” by class members); Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 483 
F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1973); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (D. Ohio 1969) (revisions were 
intended to prevent one-way intervention).
89 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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is the concern that led the Eisen Court to declare that preliminary inquiries into the merits 
were “directly contrary” to Rule 23(c)(1).90
This section compares different Eisen rules with respect to the preclusive effect of 
judgments.  Two situations are relevant: cherry-picking cases where a plaintiffs obtain a 
litigation advantage over the defendant through informed use of opt-out rights and 
cherry-dropping cases where the non-mutuality of estoppel is a function of certification 
itself and does not depend on the volitional act of any  class members.
A.  Cherry-Picking: Unfairness Due to Informed Exercise of Opt-Out Rights 
The following model illustrates the problem of cherry-picking.  Call an absent 
class member P and the defendant D.  Cases have merit when p is at least 5% and lack 
merit when p is less than 5%.  When cases have merit, p is either low or high.  At 
certification, the court applies a strong-form, weak-form, or super-weak rule.  Under the 
strong-form rule the court certifies the class without inquiring into p.  Under the super-
weak rule the court investigates p and certifies it finds the case to have merit and refuses 
to certify if it finds the case to lack merit. In either event the court issues an opinion that 
discloses its assessment of p.  The class wins at trial when the court preliminarily assesses 
p as high and loses at trial when the court preliminarily assesses p as low.  Under the 
weak-form rule, the court investigates the merits only insofar as they relate to a specific 
certification requirement under Rule 23. 
90 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.  Although the Court indicated that preliminary inquiries were “directly 
contrary” to Rule 23(c)(1), it could not have meant that such inquires violated an express prohibition of the 
rule.  The word “practicable” gives trial courts a significant degree of discretion to manage the timing of 
decisions, including the power in appropriate cases to consider merits issues prior to certification.  Curtin v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 348 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 275 F.3d 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001), citing Cowen v. Bank 
United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995). This discretion has been enhanced under newly-amended 
Rule 23(c)(1), which requires only that the certification decision be made at an “early practicable time.”  
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Suppose a strong-form rule is in effect.  Because the court is prohibited from 
inquiring into the merits at certification, P has no information about the court’s views. 
Because P don’t get an advance peek at the probable outcome, she enjoys no strategic 
advantage.  Mutuality of estoppel is maintained.  
Suppose now that a super-weak rule is in effect.  The trial court certifies a (b)(3) 
class after assessing p and concluding that the case has merit.  The court issues an 
opinion explaining its decision and disclosing the court’s estimate of p.  If the court 
concludes that p is high P remains in the litigation and takes advantage of the anticipated 
good outcome.  If the court concludes that p is low P opts out and avoids the preclusive 
effect of the anticipated bad outcome.91  Because the opt-out decision is made on the 
basis of valuable information, P arguably enjoys an unfair strategic advantage.92
However, the likelihood of prejudice to D from the operation of a super-weak rule 
is smaller than first appears.  Consider the case where P opts out of a class when the court 
finds that p is low.  This scenario will result in harm to D only if the following conditions 
or events occur.  P must be someone who would not otherwise opt out.  The court must 
conclude that the case has merit but p is low.  The court must also conclude that the 
action is otherwise certifiable.  The outcome of the litigation must be unfavorable for P.93
The court’s opinion about p must be communicated to P who must correctly analyze the 
opinion, decide to opt out, and actually exclude herself.  P must then participate in a 
91 See Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 (4th Cir. 1980) (the specific concern 
of the Eisen court was “to protect the party opposing the class against a no-risk specific testing of the merits of 
the claims by a class representative.”)
92 Eisen, supra, 147 U.S. at 177 (preliminary inquiries would permit the representative plaintiff to 
“obtain a determination on the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance 
that a class action may be maintained.”)
93 If there were no correlation between the results of the preliminary inquiry and the ultimate 
judgment or settlement, then the class member would gain no information from the court’s pre-certification 
investigation.  
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separate lawsuit against D that results in an outcome more favorable to P than the 
outcome would have been if she had not opted out.
Some of these conditions appear plausible.  For example, because only a small 
percentage of class members opt out of the typical case,94 it is likely P would be someone 
who would not otherwise opt out.  Similarly, it is plausible to assume that the court’s 
preliminary assessment of p will align with the final outcome.  Other conditions are less 
plausible.  It would be unusual for the trial court to make preliminary findings that p is 
low and also certify the class.95  When p is low, this will usually be for reasons that also 
counsel against certification under Rule 23's specific requirements; and when p is high, 
this will usually support certification.96  The dynamics of litigation also promote this 
alignment: class attorneys are unlikely to support certification with information that 
reduces D’s liability and defense attorneys are equally unlikely to resist certification with 
information favorable to P.  To the extent courts use certification as a preliminary merits 
screen, moreover, the effect will further increase the alignment between assessments of 
the merits and certification.
It is also doubtful that after opting out P would be able to participate in a different 
lawsuit and obtain an outcome more favorable than what P would obtain in the first 
action.  Such a lawsuit would typically be uneconomic unless P joined another class 
94 See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, ___ Vanderbilt Law Review ___ (forthcoming).
95 But not impossible.  Imagine, for example, that under the plaintiff’s theory of the case, damages 
would have to be individually determined for each class member, whereas under the defendant’s theory of 
the case, no class member would be entitled to any damages at all.  The court might conclude that the 
defendant has the better of the argument about the merits, but might then use this conclusion to support 
certification because it eliminates the individual issue of proving damages.  
96 For example, in a securities fraud case, it is in the class’s interest at trial for the court to conclude 
that a fraud-on-the-market presumption is available, since this will potentially eliminate the otherwise—
applicable requirements of proving individual reliance, damages, and loss-causation.  But availability of a 
fraud-on-the-market presumption is also crucial to certification.  Conversely, if a court refuses to recognize 
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action.  But the smaller size97 and lower probability of success98 that would characterize 
such alternative litigation would pose an obstacle to any attorney representing such a 
class.99  To be successful, moreover, the second lawsuit must be certified if it is a class 
action100 and must generate a better outcome for P than the first case would have 
generated.101
Also implausible is the premise that P would grasp the full implications of the 
preliminary inquiry and take appropriate action in response.  There is no requirement that 
the judge issue an opinion signaling her views of p.  If issued, the opinion would not be 
provided to P.  P would receive instead a notice of certification coupled with information 
about how she can opt out.  Even if the notice describes the trial court’s preliminary 
assessment of p,102 it is unlikely to convey the clear message that P is better off opting 
a fraud-on-the-market presumption, this will be unfavorable to the class on the merits and also reduce the 
chance the case will be certified.
97 If the alternative class is composed of people who opted out of the first case, the class size is likely 
to be significantly reduced.  
98 Any attorney contemplating whether to represent the opt-out class would need to consider 
carefully the fact that the trial court in the original action has expressed a negative view of the merits.  Even 
if the second action is filed in a different jurisdiction, the unfavorable judicial opinion is likely to reduce the 
settlement value of the new case.
99 The counsel in the first-filed class action would be in an uncomfortable position representing a 
class of persons who opted out of the counsel’s other case.   He cannot be expected to come forward as 
champion of the opt-out class.  
100 The case was certified in the first jurisdiction, but only after the trial court reached an unfavorable 
view of the class’s chance on the merits.  Class counsel in the second case hopes to persuade the court that 
the case can be certified even under a preliminary view of the merits more favorable to the class.  But 
counsel may not succeed at persuading the second tribunal to accept a view of the merits more favorable to 
the class.  Moreover, because the decision to certify (or not certify) a class is within the discretion of the 
trial court, the outcome of a certification dispute can never be confidently predicted in advance.
101 The probability of a favorable outcome is reduced by the fact that the trial court in the first action 
reached an unfavorable view of the class’s chances on the merits.  Although such a review would probably 
not constrain the power of a different trial judge or jury to reach a contrary conclusion, it nevertheless 
stands as a warning signal that an attorney for the class would ignore at her peril.
102 Nothing in Rule 23(c)(2)(B), governing notice in (b)(3) cases, requires that any information about the 
court’s certification decision be provided to the class.
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out.103  Few Ps would be able to make an independent evaluation of the pros and cons of 
opting out and take appropriate action in response.  
Consider now the case where P otherwise would have opted out but decides not to 
opt out because the preliminary inquiry discloses the court’s view that p is high.  D now 
faces a class case with another member.  D will suffer prejudice only if a number of 
conditions and events occur, however.  P must be someone who would otherwise opt out 
of the class.  The court must make a preliminary finding that p is high and must also 
conclude the action otherwise satisfies Rules 23(a) and (b). The preliminary assessment 
of p must be communicated to and understood P and must result in her deciding not to 
opt out. The ultimate outcome must favor P.  And P must impose greater costs on D by 
remaining in the case than she would impose by opting out.
The assumptions of this scenario are in some respects more plausible than the 
assumptions of the preceding one.  It is likely, for example, that if the court certifies the 
case it will also make preliminary merits findings that p is high.  Similarly, because P 
would otherwise opt out, it can be inferred that she is interested enough in the case to 
read the class action notice and make a reasoned decision about what to do.  It is also 
plausible to assume that D will be worse off if P stays in the case than if she opts out.104
103 None of the parties responsible for notice has an incentive to convey such information.  Once the 
class has been certified with a preliminary assessment unfavorable to the class on the merits, the defendant 
has an interest in keeping as many class members in the forum as possible in hopes of obtaining a favorable 
judgment or settlement binding on all who do not opt out.  The plaintiff’s attorney also has an interest in 
discouraging opt outs.  He or she represents the class in the certified case, and accordingly stands to lose 
fees if large numbers of class members defect.  As for the trial judge who oversees the certification notice, 
there is also little to be gained other than headache if large numbers of class members opt out.  The case 
will still remain on the judge’s docket, and opt-outs can cause problems if competing class actions are 
commenced in other jurisdictions.   
104 This is so because many plaintiffs who would have opted out would fail to pursue their claims in
any other forum.  The effect is not unambiguous, however.  Some plaintiffs would have participated in 
litigation against the defendant in an alternative forum if they opted out of the first case.  For alternative 
litigation to occur, it would be necessary for the opt-out class member to be represented by counsel.  While 
counsel in the original litigation is unlikely to be available to represent plaintiffs in such a case, there is some 
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Other assumptions are less plausible, however.  Most importantly, the scenario assumes 
that P would otherwise opt out.  But class members rarely opt out.  Moreover, P might 
not change her mind even if she understood the trial court’s preliminary inquiry.  Some 
people opt out because they don’t like litigation, don’t want to sue D, or just don’t want 
to be bothered.  
Weak-form rules present an intermediate case.  Because they disclose the trial 
court’s preliminary assessment of issues relevant to certification, they do offer some 
information that P could use to advantage when deciding whether to opt out.  The risk of 
cherry-picking is therefore higher than in the case of strong-form rules where such 
information is prohibited.  However, the risk of cherry-picking is significantly lower than 
the case of super-weak rules.  Because the preliminary inquiry under a weak-form rule 
relates only to a specific issue in the case, the trial court's opinion on certification will not 
provide an estimate of p.  The opinion would require sophisticated analysis before its 
impact on p could be understood, a task beyond the means of most class members.  The 
trial court’s preliminary view of the merits, moreover, is much less likely to align with 
the ultimate outcome than is its opinion as to p under a super-weak rule. The merits 
issues addressed under a weak-form rule will only be a subset of matters relevant to the 
ultimate outcome at trial, and often a small subset at that.  The results of the preliminary 
assessment under a weak-form rule are also less likely to influence the trial court’s 
subsequent conduct in the case.  Because the issues addressed under a weak-form rule are 
probability that another attorney would come forward to represent the plaintiff in an alternative forum.  In the 
scenario we are considering, the judge in the first litigation issues a preliminary assessment of the merits 
favorable to the class.  Given this premise, it is likely that that the merits are reasonably favorable for the class 
in alternative forums as well.  With a relatively stronger case, counsel is more likely to come forward to 
represent class members who do opt out.  As to such plaintiffs, the defendant will be worse off from the 
party’s decision to remain in the initial litigation only if the added costs or litigation and expected judgment in 
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narrow, they are unlikely to exercise as much sway on the trial judge’s mind; and the 
presence of many other issues provides cover for the trial court to change her opinion 
without admitting error in the initial decision.
2.  Cherry-Dropping: Automatic Benefit 
The preceding scenarios assume that P actively decides whether to opt out or stay 
in a case.  But active decision-making is not necessary for P to obtain a benefit analogous 
to one-way intervention.  This effect can be illustrated if we add to the model set forth 
above the assumption that P remains entirely passive in the litigation.
Under a strong-form rule, certification has no relationship to the merits.  
Accordingly, there should be no correlation between the two.  The certification decision 
itself therefore confers no systematic advantage on either party with respect to the 
preclusive effect of judgments.
Consider now the situation under a super-weak rule.  If the court concludes on 
preliminary inquiry that the case is not meritorious, it will not certify the class and P will 
automatically avoid the preclusive effect of the adverse judgment.  If the court concludes 
that the case is meritorious, it will certify the class and declare p as low or high.  If the 
probabilities of these events were equal, P would not enjoy any systematic advantage 
over D in a certified case.  But the probabilities are not equal.  If the court certifies the 
case, it is more likely to conclude that p is high than that p is low. Since the class wins at 
trial when the court concludes that p is high, P will obtain the advantage of the favorable 
outcome by remaining passive.  The result is an approximation of one-way intervention. 
The cherries of favorable treatment drop from the tree without having to be picked; the 
the initial litigation with that party remaining in the case exceed the added costs of litigation and expected 
judgment that would be incurred in the alternative proceeding if the party opted out.
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certification decision itself does the work.  Because this effect does not depend on opt-out 
rights, moreover, it could exist for mandatory as well as opt-out classes.
Again, however, the harm to D under the super-weak rule turns out to be less 
serious than first appears.  Consider first the situation where the court certifies the case 
and the class wins at trial.  P obtains the preclusive effect of a favorable judgment --
arguably an unfair result for D.  However, for D to be prejudiced by certification, a 
number of events or conditions have to be true.  Some of these are plausible.  It is 
reasonable to assume that P will not opt out and that the court will conclude that p is high 
in a certified case.  It is also reasonable to suppose that the class will win at trial when the 
court concludes that p is high.  Other events or conditions are less plausible, however.  
For D to be prejudiced as a result of the preliminary inquiry, it is usually necessary that 
the case would not otherwise be certified.  But because strong-form rules require the 
court to accept as true the class action allegations in the complaint, the case will 
ordinarily be certified under a strong-form rule.  Thus, when p is high, the preliminary 
inquiry will usually only confirm a result that the court would reach in any event.  Hence 
D will usually suffer no harm.105
Consider now the case where the trial court denies certification after a preliminary 
review of p in a case where P would lose if the case had proceeded to a judgment as a 
class action.  The effect of the preliminary inquiry would be to deny D the benefit of a 
judgment that binds P to the unfavorable outcome.  D appears to be prejudiced.
Some parts of the scenario are plausible.  Where the class loses at trial, it is likely 
that p is low.  Where p is low, the trial court is likely to find it to be low at the 
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preliminary inquiry.  And if the trial court finds p to be so low that the case lacks merit, 
the court will refuse to certify the class.  It also appears plausible that in the absence of a 
preliminary inquiry the court would certify the class, since it would then have to take as 
true the class action allegations in the complaint. 
However, for this scenario to come to pass, it will be necessary for the court to 
conclude at the preliminary inquiry that the case lacks merit.  Putting aside settlement 
incentives (for the moment), it would be in neither party’s interest to bring this fact to the 
court’s attention at certification.  P's attorney has two reasons to suppress the information.  
If the court knows that the case lacks merit, it is likely to refuse certification and thus 
deny P’s attorney the class action she seeks.  Even if the court certifies the class, its 
advance knowledge that the case lacks merit might prejudice its subsequent conduct of 
the trial, leading to a greater probability of a bad outcome for P. D does have an 
incentive to inform the court that the case lacks merit -- eventually.  But we are here 
assuming that D wants the case to be certified so that it can thereafter hold class members 
to an unfavorable judgment.  D would delay informing the court until after certification, 
since informing the court beforehand merely reduces the probability of a result 
(certification) that D desires.  Unless the court conducts an independent investigation, the 
weakness of the class claims is unlikely to come to its attention at certification.  It is 
therefore unlikely that certification will be denied as a result of the preliminary inquiry.
Suppose, however, that the court does become aware that the case lacks merit, 
either because the court is pro-active in seeking information or because D dislikes the 
increased risk incident to certification more than it likes the possibility of binding class 
105 See Fisher v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 217 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“Eschewing a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits and accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, however, accords the 
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members to an unfavorable judgment.  The court might then refuse to certify the class 
even though in the absence of a preliminary investigation it would grant certification.  
But even here D would not necessarily suffer material harm from the loss of a preclusive 
decree.  Preclusion is valuable to D only if P would participate in other litigation in the 
event certification is denied.  Such follow-on litigation would face serious obstacles.106
The preclusive effect of a decree in a certified class would provide no benefit to D if no 
follow-on litigation would be brought.
Weak-form rules are again an intermediate case.  The inquiry authorized in a 
weak-form rule will, to some extent, align trial outcomes with the results of the court’s 
preliminary investigation.  Thus, unlike the case with strong-form rules, some cherry-
dropping effect is possible.  But the prejudice to D will be less under a weak-form rule 
than under a super-weak rule.  The reason is that the alignment between trial outcomes 
and preliminary investigation is not as strong.  As we have seen, under a weak-form rule 
the trial court examines only merits issues insofar as they are convenient or useful to the 
analysis of specific Rule 23 prerequisites.  Even if they stand up through trial, the court’s 
evaluation of those questions will not necessarily determine outcomes because other 
issues not relevant to the merits may swamp them out.  The trial court, moreover, is less 
likely to adopt a biased view of the case at the preliminary inquiry under a weak-form 
rule, and thus should be more willing than under a super-weak rule to adjust her views as 
the trial progresses.  Because certification is not as strongly predictive of trial victory for 
same benefits to the plaintiff with even less deference to the defendant's position.”)
106 Although because certification of the first case has been denied, class counsel will be available to 
bring the second suit, the first court’s opinion finding that the class claims are weak on the merits would be 
a significant deterrent.  The attorney may also need to consider the possible effects of the first decision 
denying class certification.  See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763  (7th Cir. 
2003) (ordering injunction against state court certification of class claims where federal court had previously 
denied certification of identical claims).
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the class, cherry-dropping is less of a problem for weak-form rules than it is for super-
weak rules.
V.  Settlement Effects
We now compare Eisen rules with respect to their effects on settlement.   Class 
certification can convert a small case into one with potentially devastating consequences,107
thus imposing significant settlement pressures on D.108 Refusal to certify a class can have 
equally devastating consequences for P since it converts viable class litigation into a 
negative value individual case.  Which rule is most likely to shield the parties from unfair 
settlement pressures?
Consider the following extension on the model previously developed.  Call P’s 
damages d.  P’s expected outcome at trial is p x d.  A settlement is fair if it is no more 
than twice or less then half p x d and unfair otherwise. All Ps are identically situated and 
the requirements for certification are otherwise satisfied.  P sues D and moves to certify a 
class of 1,000 persons.  D is able to satisfy a judgment up to $75,000,000 without 
financial distress.  Any judgment over $75,000,000 will cause financial distress.  D is 
averse to the risk of financial distress and will pay up to ten times the expected judgment 
at trial to avoid it. D is risk-neutral about judgments that do not cause financial distress.  
If P wins on her individual claims, she gets $100,000; if she loses, she gets nothing.  For 
simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that D will offer its full reservation 
price in settlement without adjustment for litigation costs and that P will accept the offer.  
107 See, e.g., Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke 
Law Journal 1251 (2002); cases cited in note x, supra.
108 How overwhelming these pressures are is a matter of current debate.  For a debunking view, see 
Charles Silver, We’re Scared to Death: Class Certification and Blackmail, 28 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 1357 (2003).
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Both P and D correctly assess p at 1% and d at $100,000 and the court also correctly 
assesses p at 1% if a preliminary inquiry is undertaken.
In such circumstances, if a strong-form rule is in effect, the court will not conduct 
a preliminary inquiry into p and will certify the class because all other prerequisites of 
Rule 23 are satisfied.  Once the class is certified, D’s maximum exposure is $100,000,000 
and its expected liability at trial is $1,000,000.  Because D is averse to the risk of 
financial distress posed by the potential exposure to a $100,000,000 judgment, D will pay 
$10,000,000 or $10,000 per class member to settle the case.  Because this is more than 
twice p x d, the settlement is unfair. This is the “blackmail” settlement that proponents of 
super-weak rules dislike – a payment far in excess of the actual liability exposure made in 
a weak case only because the defendant fears the low-probability outcome.109
The super-weak rule addresses this danger.  With such a rule in effect, the court 
would conduct a preliminary inquiry into p at certification and refuse to certify the class 
upon finding that the case lacks merit.  D’s maximum exposure on P’s individual claim is 
$100,000.  Because D is risk-neutral as to this outcome, it will pay only its expected 
judgment p x d to settle P’s case, or $1,000.  Even if all Ps  brought individual lawsuits, D 
would still be risk-neutral because no one suit would expose it to a risk of financial 
distress; thus D would pay a total of only $1,000,000 to settle all the cases.  So long as no 
class action is filed in another jurisdiction after the court denies certification, the super-
weak rule eliminates the unfair settlement as far as D is concerned.
109 See, e.g. Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should 
Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 373 (1996) (preliminary assessment of the merits would 
“preclude certification of the weakest class action claims, where the pressures to settle are particularly 
unfair”).
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But while the super-weak rule handles one problem of unfairness, it does so by 
creating another.  The class claims have some probability of success, albeit a low one (if 
the claims were completely frivolous, even a risk-averse defendant would not pay to 
settle them because there would be no reason to fear a bad outcome at trial.)  A settlement 
of P’s claim would be fair if it is at least $500 (half of p x d).  But with the super-weak
rule in effect P will obtain much less.  D would pay an amount equal to its expected 
liability to all Ps who bring individual cases in the event that certification is denied.  D 
expects that few such cases will be brought given that each P can expect to recover only 
$1,000 in an individual lawsuit.  The conditions are present for a settlement class which 
provides only such relief as may be needed to justify a fee for P’s attorney.110  The result 
would be a settlement below $500 per P.  This is a blackmail settlement in reverse: class 
claims are sold out for pennies on the dollars.  The super-weak rule does not eliminate the 
unfairness but only shifts its incidence.
Other problems become apparent when we allow for party error about p.  It will 
be rare for P and D to know p with certainty. It will often be the case, instead, that they 
are mutually optimistic – P thinks p is higher than D thinks it is. In fact, given the 
conditions of the model, disagreement about p would be implied if P moves for class 
certification.111
Suppose D incorrectly believes p is 1% and P correctly believes p is 5%.  Under a 
strong-form rule, the court will certify the class and D will pay $10,000,000 to settle the 
class claims.  This settlement is fair: each class member receives $10,000 which is only 
twice p x d ($5,000).
110 Providing the parties can get this settlement past a reviewing court.
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The result is different under a super-weak rule.  Suppose that after conducting the 
preliminary inquiry the court is equally likely to agree with D or P.  If the court agrees with 
P, the case will be certified and the court will issue a ruling accurately assessing p at 5%.  
After reviewing the ruling, D would adjust its assessment of p to 5%.  D now estimates its 
expected judgment at trial as $5,000 per P or $5,000,000 overall.  Facing possible financial 
distress from a class-wide judgment, D will settle for ten times the expected judgment at 
trial, or $50,000,000.  The settlement is unfair.
The court might agree with D that p is only 1%.  If the court agrees with D, the case 
will not be certified and D will pay Ps who sue individually $1,000 to settle their individual 
cases.   This is a good outcome for D although unfair for P.  Even so, D’s expected 
settlement cost under the super-weak rule is more than $25,000,000 (50% x $50,000,000 + 
50% x the expected costs of individual cases that would be litigated if the case is not 
certified).  D’s expected settlement cost of > $25,000 per class member is unfair because it 
is more than five times greater than p x d.   
The possibility of judicial error in assessing p exacerbates problems of fairness in 
settlement under a super-weak rule.  Suppose in the example above that P evaluates p at 5% 
and D evaluates p at 1%.  The result under a strong-form regime is the same as before: 
because the court takes no account of the merits, the case will be certified and D will pay 
$10,000,000 in settlement.
Under a super-weak regime, the outcome depends on the nature of the error.  
Suppose that the true value of p is 1% but the court erroneously assesses p at 5%.  Because 
the court (erroneously) concludes that the class claims have merit, it certifies the class.  
111 If both parties know that p is 1% and know that the other knows this, and they also know that the 
court will correctly analyze p in the preliminary inquiry, then P would never bother to seek certification.
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Assume further that the court is conditioned into an overly favorable view of the class’s 
case as a result of the mistaken preliminary inquiry, and that in consequence p becomes
5%.  D reviews the decision on class certification which discloses the court’s preliminary 
assessment of p.  D estimates that because the court is now conditioned into a favorable 
view of the class’s case, the value of p is 5%.  Because D is averse to the risk of the 
maximum possible judgment of $100,000,000, D pays ten times the expected judgment at 
trial or $50,000,000 in settlement.  The unfairness of the settlement for D is magnified as a 
result of the super-weak rule: D pays each class member fifty times p x d.
Suppose that the true value of p is 5% but the court erroneously assesses p at 1%.  
The court will refuse to certify the class.  Ps have to sue individually or recover nothing.  
Because their individual claims are small, few of them are likely to sue.  Moreover, the 
likelihood they will sue is further reduced by the court’s mistake at certification.  Since the 
court issues an opinion disclosing its (erroneous) estimate of p – an opinion that will be 
available to any court adjudicating the individual suits – Ps will need to adjust downward 
their estimates of p.  Instead of receiving $50,000,000 – the amount D would pay to settle 
the class case if the court correctly estimated p – or even $10,000,000 – the fair settlement 
if the court correctly estimated p – Ps receive only a few thousand dollars in the aggregate, 
a outcome even more unfair than the situation where the court correctly estimates p at 1%.
Judicial error under a super-weak rule can thus result in settlements that are unfair 
to either P or D.  As between them, however, P is more likely to suffer harm.  The reason is 
that because the preliminary inquiry into p occurs early in the litigation, D will be able 
control the information available to the court.  D’s advantage would be even greater if the 
court adopted the recommendation of some commentators that p should be determined 
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through test-case litigation.112  In such litigation the stakes for D would be far greater than
the stakes for any P.  For this reason, D will tend to expend greater resources than Ps and 
will have an incentive to offer generous settlements to make test cases “go away” if they 
have bad facts.  The predictable result is that test case litigation will generate estimates of p 
that are below the true value of that parameter.
Weak-form rules appear to offer a better mix of settlement effects than either of the 
alternatives.  Unlike strong-form rules, they do not require the trial court to accept the 
plaintiff’s allegations as true.  In consequence, they will sometimes work to prevent 
certification of cases when the defendant’s aversion to the risk of a ruinous judgment forces 
an unfair settlement.  On the other hand, weak-form rules are less likely than super-weak 
rules to have other adverse settlement effects.  They do not preclude certification of low-
probability, non-frivolous cases.  Thus they are less likely to force class counsel to settle 
out claims for much less than their expected value at trial in order to avoid the lack of any 
recovery at all that would follow from denial of certification.  Moreover, weak-form rules, 
unlike super-weak rules, do not interact pathologically with party or judicial error.113
VI.  Judicial Economy
112 See Geoffrey Hazard, Class Certification Based on the Merits of the Claims, 69 Tennessee Law 
Review 1 (2001) (proposing that a sample of “typical” claims be tried prior to final certification in order to 
provide information about the value of the class claims).  The Seventh Circuit, in Rhone-Poulenc, did 
something like this when it examined the results of individual cases already completed in order to assess the 
value of p.  See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (based on the fact that 
defendants had won 12 of 13 individual cases the court concluded that there was a “great likelihood” that the 
class claims “lacked legal merit”).  Judge Parker of the Eastern District of Texas proposed a similar procedure 
for assessing the value of asbestos cases, although for purposes of deciding the case on the merits rather than 
class certification. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990).  However, the 
idea was rejected by the Fifth Circuit. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
113 If, for example, D erroneously estimates p as low, the results of the preliminary inquiry under a 
weak-form rule will not necessarily cause D to revise its estimate of p upward by a significant amount because 
the court’s opinion will not reveal much information about p.  The problem of unfair settlements will not be 
magnified as under a super-weak regime.  Similarly, judicial error will be less of a problem under a weak-
form rule.  Courts will be less prone to make errors about the specific issues relevant to certification.  And if 
error occurs, it will be less likely to cause error at trial and thus will have a smaller effect on D’s estimate of p.
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A final consideration in the design of an Eisen rule is its effect on judicial 
economy.114  A strong-form rule conserves judicial and party resources because it 
obviates any need for the court to inquire into the merits at certification.  The fact that a 
strong-form rule achieves this kind of economy is hardly an argument in its favor.  The 
same sort of economy could be achieved any time issues are excluded from a case.  If a 
court in an antitrust case simply declared, without evidence, that the defendant possessed 
power in the relevant market, this would certainly simplify the trial of the case, but it 
would do so at a high and inappropriate cost since the existence of market power is one 
of the principal matters at issue in the litigation.  When an inquiry into the merits is 
necessary or appropriate to resolve an important issue for certification, the summary 
adjudication made possible by a strong-form rule requires greater justification than the 
fact that it will save resources for the court and the parties.115
The efficiency effects of super-weak rules are ambiguous.  Because p is the 
ultimate issue in the litigation, the preliminary inquiry must be extensive enough to yield 
an informed decision.  If the result of that inquiry is an accurate conclusion that the case 
lacks merit, the court will refuse to certify the class.  The denial of certification conserves 
on judicial resources in the class case, since the expected outcome is that the class would 
lose at any event at trial.  But the denial of certification also permits Ps to sue 
114 See Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law 
Journal 1251, 1316-18 (2002) (analyzing “process costs” of rules on certification and the substantive merits).
115 In other cases, moreover, a strong-form rule can foster diseconomy rather than economies of 
litigation.  Consider a case where the judge, from prior experience with the subject matter of a case, knows 
that she is likely to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The arguments that would be fatal 
to the claim on the motion to dismiss are also brought forward by the defendant as objections to certifying 
the class.  It would make little sense, in this scenario, for the court to apply a strong-form rule to avoid 
reaching the merits, certify the class and only then reach the and either dismiss the case or decertify the 
class.  Cf. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 n.11 (4th Cir. 1980) (observing the 
potential waste of judicial resources inherent in deferred denial of class certification based on adverse merits 
determinations, but viewing such a waste as real only if the court could have decided the merits earlier).
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individually.  If, as often will be the case, such suits are not pursued, the super-weak rule 
will conserve resources.  But if Ps sue individually, notwithstanding the court’s 
preliminary assessment that the case lacks merit, the burden on the court could increase 
because issues that could be handled on a common basis in class litigation must now be 
litigated separately in each individual case.
If after initial inquiry the court concludes that the case has merit, the super-weak 
rule could increase the burden on the court and the parties to the extent that overlapping 
issues will have to be retried at the merits phase.  Intelligent litigation management can 
reduce the overlap.116  But inevitably some inefficiency will result: there will be 
duplication in discovery, multiple depositions, and extra judicial hearings.  On the other 
hand, the preliminary inquiry may conserve on resources if it extent that results in more 
informed judicial decisions during the trial phase.  Even more important, the court’s 
preliminary assessment of p may induce the parties to adopt more realistic bargaining 
positions and thus facilitate earlier settlements.
The efficiency implications of the weak- form rule are also ambiguous.  Because 
they do authorize preliminary inquiries into the merits, weak-form rules are more
burdensome at the front end than strong-form rules.  But because the inquiry is focused 
on merits issues that specifically relate to the certification requirements of Rule 23, weak-
form rules entail a less onerous inquiry than would be implied by super-weak rules.  As 
in the case of super-weak rules, moreover, preliminary inquiries under a weak-form rule 
might have efficiency-enhancing effects to the extent that they focus the trial court’s 
attention on the case at an early point in the litigation and induce better trial and pretrial 
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management.  Preliminary merits rulings under weak-form rules may also facilitate 
earlier settlements, although the settlement effect for weak-form rules is likely to be less 
pronounced than for super-weak rules where the court’s preliminary assessment of  p 
addresses the ultimate question in the lawsuit.  Similarly, the potential inefficiencies of 
the preliminary inquiry under a weak-form rule can be mitigated if the parties and the 
trial court organize the inquiry in such a way that the efforts of the court and the parties 
are not duplicated at trial.
VII. Why a Weak-Form Rule is Best
We can now draw the strands of normative analysis together in order to develop 
an overall assessment of which rule offers the best combination of social policy benefits.  
Strong-form rules have little to recommend them and should be abandoned.117
They cannot be justified as plausible interpretations of Rule 23 and are in fact 
inconsistent with Rule 23 insofar as they bar courts from inquiring into relevant matters.
Strong-form rules impair the accuracy of certification decisions by excluding 
relevant information.  They may increase the accuracy of trial outcomes by preventing 
the court from making mistakes at certification that “color” subsequent proceedings.  But 
this effect is ambiguous because early exposure to merits issues may improve rather than 
impair trial outcomes.  Even if trial outcomes are improved, on balance, the increase in 
accuracy at trial provided by a strong-form rule would have to be weighed against the 
loss of accuracy at certification.  Given the widely-recognized importance of certification 
116 See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include 
an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 400 (1996) (arguing that much of the work of the preliminary 
investigation into the substantive merits could be reused at trial).
117 This view is shared by other recent commentators.  See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for 
Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1996) 
(advocating jettisoning strong-form rule in its entirety); Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification 
and the Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251 (2002) (same).
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for the success or failure of class litigation, it is unlikely that the increase in trial accuracy 
which a strong-form rule might accomplish could justify the significant decrease in 
accuracy at certification.
Strong-form rules find limited support in the concern for fairness to defendants, 
since if rigorously applied they prevent class members from taking advantage of 
favorable outcomes while avoiding the binding effects of unfavorable ones.  But a 
number of events or conditions have to coincide before cherry-picking or cherry-
dropping will result in harm to defendants.  Moreover, while defendants benefit from the 
leveling of the playing field with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments, they suffer 
collateral harm from the increased settlement pressure that follows when the court 
accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. Nor can strong-form rules 
be justified as means for conserving litigation resources.  To the extent they reduce the 
burden on the parties and the courts, they do so only by removing relevant considerations 
from the court’s analysis.  This is not a good justification for judicial economy.
Super-weak rules are equally undesirable and should not be adopted.  They have 
no basis in the text or history of Rule 23.  Because they permit or require trial courts to 
inquire into an issue that is not an explicit certification factor under Rule 23, they may 
introduce a confounding issue that results in erroneous certification decisions.  They 
present a substantial risk of “coloring” the trial with potentially erroneous findings.  
Fairness to the defendant with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments is also a 
concern under super-weak rules.  These rules provide significant information that may 
give plaintiffs an unfair advantage in making opt-out decisions.  They also align the 
certification decision with the ultimate result at trial, resulting in an automatic “cherry-
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dropping” benefit to class members.  Although defendants will only occasionally 
experience significant harm from these scenarios, the risk of unfairness to defendants that 
troubled the Court in Eisen is not insubstantial.
Super-weak rules address the problem of unfair settlements of weak cases.  But 
they do so only by introducing other problems.  Denial of certification of non-frivolous 
but weak cases has devastating settlement consequences for class members.  Moreover, 
problems of unfair settlements are exacerbated under a super-weak regime when party or 
judicial error is introduced. Super-weak rules likewise appear less attractive from the 
standpoint of judicial efficiency.  Because they require the court to conduct an inquiry into 
the ultimate issue at trial, the certification stage can be anticipated to be costly for the 
parties and time-consuming for the court.  This fact in itself would not be troubling if the 
results of the preliminary inquiry could be utilized at later stages of the case or in individual 
litigation of cases after certification is denied.  But often the efforts will be wasted.  
Weak-form rules are superior along most of the relevant policy dimensions. Such 
rules easy to justify in the language of Rule 23 and finds increasing support in the lower 
federal courts and the views of some commentators.118 Weak-form rules provide greater 
accuracy in the certification decision than either a strong-form rule or a super-weak rule.  
As to accuracy at trial, weak-form rules are likely to be superior to super-weak rules 
(because of the risk that error in assessing p will color subsequent proceedings and result in 
118 Bone and Evans endorse a weak-form rule as one possible approach, although for different reasons 
than those set forth in this Article.  See Robert Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the 
Substantive Merits, 51 Duke Law Journal 1251, 1278 (2002) (offering the principle that the “trial judge 
[should] review the evidence and determine whether the legal and factual issues on which the parties rely to 
support (or oppose) commonality, typicality, predominance and other Rule 23 certification requirements are in 
fact viable”).  Their arguments in favor of weak-form rules are, however, different from the arguments 
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erroneous outcomes).  Weak-form rules have strengths and weaknesses, with respect to 
error at trial, as compared with strong-form rules.
Weak-form rules are subject, to some extent, to the problems of cherry-picking and 
cherry-dropping discussed earlier in this paper.  But because the preliminary inquiry is 
restricted to narrow issues, these problems are less severe for weak-form rules than for 
super-weak rules. As applied to weak-form rules, at least, the poltergeist of one-way 
intervention conjured in Eisen has few material manifestations.
Weak-form rules provide some protections to defendants against the risk of unfair
settlements.  Because there is a strong expected alignment between the preliminary findings 
on the merits and a court’s propensity to certify the class, negative findings on merits issues 
will often prevent certification.  Thus, if the class cases are extremely weak, the result even 
under a weak-form rule may be denial of certification.  In this respect, weak-form rules are 
arguably superior to strong-form rules that offer no protection against certification of 
doubtful cases.  Super-weak rules appear to offer still greater protections in this regard, but 
they do so at unacceptable costs in other respects.
Weak-form rules are more demanding of judicial and party resources than strong-
form rules that preclude all preliminary inquiry into the merits.  But as noted above, some 
of the work at the initial inquiry stage could be recycled.  Weak-form rules appear to 
achieve greater litigation efficiency than super-weak rules which require the trial court to 
investigate the ultimate issue of the plaintiff’s probability of success.
Conclusion
The strong-form interpretation of Eisen – under which trial court may not conduct 
a reasoned inquiry into merits issues as they relate to class certification – cannot be 
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justified under any plausible analysis of public policy.  It should be abandoned – and soon.  
But super-weak rules which permit or even require the court to inquire into the plaintiff’s 
ultimate probability of success at trial are also ill-advised.  They are not defensible as 
interpretations of Rule 23 and are objectionable from the standpoint of the relevant social 
policies.  The weak-form interpretation, which permits the trial court to investigate the 
merits provided that doing so is convenient and useful to analyzing the certification 
requirements of Rule 23, provides the best mix of social policy benefits and is most 
consistent with the language and spirit of Rule 23. 
